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Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's In Memory of Her is a ground-breaking work. For the first 
time, we have a powerful defense of new theological emancipatory models of hermeneutics, critical 
method, and historical reconstruction and an application of these models in one book. This 
intentional traversing of academic disciplines—theology, ethics, church history, and biblical 
studies—for the pursuit of knowledge and empowerment of women represents a coming of age for 
liberation theology. In this essay, I shall focus solely on Schüssler Fiorenza's hermeneutical and 
methodological formulations, without losing sight of her broader concerns. 
Any major challenge to prevailing paradigms in scholarship must build upon the profound 
and persuasive insights generated by mainstream scholars yet call into question their uncritically 
accepted presuppositions, prejudgments and prejudices which deter new breakthroughs. Schüssler 
Fiorenza adopts this strategy with great effectiveness. She begins by accepting the starting point of 
biblical historical criticism: the acknowledgement of biblical texts as neither verbally inspired 
revelation nor doctrinal stipulations but rather historical responses within the context of religious 
communities over time and space. Following the feminist claim that such contexts are patriarchal 
and androcentric, Schüssler Fiorenza demystifies mainstream biblical scholarship by revealing its 
captivity to androcentrism—its relative silence on and marginalization of women's lives in the past 
and present—and by disclosing the oppositional Christian women's culture concealed by traditional 
church his-story. 
Schüssler Fiorenza moves from this "hermeneutics of suspicion" to hermeneutical combat by 
putting forward an alternative model of interpretive criteria and methodological orientation for 
unearthing, understanding, and under-girding women's individual and collective agency in the past 
and present This move is neither a glib attack on the cult of objectivity m the academy nor a vulgar 
call for women's freedom Rather it is a sophisticated fusing of hermeneutics, social theory, Christian 
ethics, and church history which specifies standards for evaluation and appropriation of past texts 
and histories, highlights gender system (women's oppression and resistance) as a fundamental 
category of historical and social analysis, and promotes Christian women's heritage 
Schüssler Fiorenza's feminist critical hermeneutics quickly dismisses the doctrinal and 
historical exegetical models of biblical interpretation by rejecting the former's ahistorical claim of 
revelational immediacy in the Bible and the latter's positivistic commitment to "value-free" inquiry 
Of course, Schüssler Fiorenza realizes that both models have been severely criticized and thoroughly 
discarded by most twentieth-century biblical scholars—yet residues such as the quest for timeless 
truth and an allegiance to detached, value-neutral investigation persists The model of dialogical-
hermeneutical interpretation is predominant in biblical scholarship The philosophical influence of 
Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur insures biblical interpretive sensitivity to the "otherness" of the 
text, the inescapable prejudices of the interpreter, and the pervasive web of language, tradition, and 
community For Schüssler Fiorenza, this model is important yet limited It is important because it 
takes historicity seriously by acknowledging the temporal situating of the interpreter and the 
illuminating potential of the interpreter's biases Yet it is limited in that it does not take history 
seriously, that is, the model refuses to dig into the depths of the cultural, political, and societal 
contexts of texts and interpreters Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur have taught biblical scholars to 
accent the existential interestedness of interpreters while listening to the "strangeness" of past texts, 
but this important insight does not encourage biblical scholars to examine also the social, political, 
and economic interests of interpreters contained in texts The model of liberation theology highlights 
these interests and brings to the surface the ideological commitments of interpreters and texts within 
the context of class struggle, cultural/racial conflict, and feminist resistance 
Schüssler Fiorenza suggests that feminist Christian scholars—since Elizabeth Cady Stanton's 
monumental The Women's Bible (1895)—have appropriated liberation themes without critically 
exammg the problems of the hermeneutical models they adopt.  She focues on two such models the 
neo-orthodox model and the sociology-of-knowledge model Feminists such as Letty Russell, Phyllis 
Trible, and Rosemary Ruether have put forward influential claims regarding the patriarchal language 
of the Bible while holding that there is a nonpatnarchal content therein This apologetic move 
presupposes fundamental distinctions between revelatory essence and historical accident, timeless 
truth and culturally conditioned language, constant Tradition and changing traditions The aim of 
such neo-orthodoxy is to confront candidly the specter of historical conditioned-ness without 
succumbing to historical relativism and to specify the biblical grounds for Christian identity (by 
preserving christocentric revelation) in the face of objections by natural theologians. 
Schüssler Fiorenza's critique of feminist neo-orthodoxy is threefold. First, she argues that 
neo-orthodox models ultimately put the burden of historical agency on God, not women. The 
worldly skepticism of neo-orthodoxy can accommodate liberation themes, but it cannot rest 
transformative powers in the praxis of oppressed peoples. Therefore the reinterpretation of the gospel 
from a liberationist perspective can yield, at most, a moral ideal and an abstract prophetic tradition 
with little grounding in the flesh-and-blood past and present of struggling peoples. Second, this 
model—against the intentions of its feminist representatives—idealizes the biblical and prophetic 
traditions by refusing to come to terms with the oppressive androcentric elements of these traditions. 
This idealization produces rather romanticist claims about the "liberating" effects of recuperating 
past prophetic traditions. The intent is admirable; yet the effect is rather empty. To put it crudely, 
the model yields theological critique, moral outrage, and ahistorical tradition-posturing, but not 
engaged empowerment of the downtrodden. Third, neo-orthodoxy posits an "Archimedean point" 
which attempts to meet secular (or religious post-Christian) feminist objections regarding the 
patriarchal and even misogynist character of Christianity; this "Archimedean point"—divine 
revelation in Jesus Christ—preserves the liberating kernel within the patriarchal husk. 
The sociology-of-knowledge model, best exemplified in Mary Daly's work, accents the 
overwhelming sexism shot through biblical texts and church traditions. This model holds that 
reconstruction and revision of such texts and traditions is anachronistic. Instead of disclosing a 
liberating essence in such texts and traditions, the model calls for new construction and new vision: 
the creation of feminist life-centers that will generate alternative ways of naming reality and modes of 
women's empowerment. It assumes that the medium is the message, that patriarchal language can 
yield only patriarchal content. Therefore new mediums and languages must be constructed by 
feminists. Schüssler Fiorenza is enchanted by the audacity of this model, especially with its 
willingness to push Christian feminists to the edge with its sober assessment of patriarchy in 
Christian texts and traditions. Yet she refuses to construe complex Christian practices as mere 
patriarchal enactments. Since the model focuses primarily on sexist language and sado-ritual 
repetitions of Goddess repression and murder, it provides shock effects to the novice (feminists-to-
be). Yet it does not deal in any serious manner with concrete socio-economic structures of 
oppression and feminist opposition to these structures. The model opts for marginality, "Otherworld 
sisterhood," and "sacred space" which reinforces the peripheral status imposed upon women in 
patriarchal society and gives the "center," the "old territory," namely, human history, to oppressive 
men and subjugated women. This model surely heightens feminist awareness of patriarchy in 
history, but it elides specific historical forms of patriarchy, abstracts from the social and historical 
relations that shape these forms, and, most important, denies the protracted struggles of women at 
the "center," in the "old territory," within human history. 
Schüssler Fiorenza's new model of feminist critical hermeneutics of liberation moves the 
focus from questions concerning the authority of biblical revelation to discussions regarding feminist 
historical reconstruction of the background conditions under which biblical texts were constituted—
from androcentric texts to patriarchal-historical contexts in which women contest and resist as well 
as defer and lose. Such reconstruction proceeds not only by delving into the liberating impulse 
within the biblical texts, but, more important, going beyond the texts to examine women's struggle 
against patriarchal canonization. Since these texts are not objective, factual reports of the past but 
rather pastorally engaged responses to particular circumstances, it is not surprising that they 
represent the views of (and for??) the "historical winners." By critically scrutinizing the canonization 
process itself, Schüssler Fiorenza goes beyond the neo-orthodox model as well as that of liberation 
theology. No longer can one simply turn to the canonical Christian texts for insights and even 
imperatives for present social and political struggles. Rather the formation of the biblical texts 
becomes a terrain of ideological and historical contestation. To start with the biblical texts, the final 
canon, and infer liberation themes, deliverance motifs, salvific principles which then serve as sources 
to criticize the texts themselves still dehistoricizes and depoliticizes the canonization process. 
For Schüssler Fiorenza, the revelatory criteria for theological evaluation and appropriation of 
the Christian past and present is trans-biblical; that is, linked to biblical texts yet substantively 
beyond them. At times, Schüssler Fiorenza nearly excludes the biblical texts and offers only Christian 
women's struggle for liberation from patriarchal oppression. At other times, she admits that this 
struggle in the past produced nonpatriarchal elements in the biblical texts. This ambiguity is seen in 
her metaphor for biblical revelation as a historical prototype not a mythic archetype—as an all-too-
human process open to critique and change rather than an ideal, timeless form. The ambiguity arises 
in that if one locates revelation first and foremost in the Christian (or non-Christian) feminist 
struggle for freedom, and if the biblical texts are fundamentally androcentric, it is unclear why the 
adjective "biblical" is used in "biblical revelation." 
This dilemma haunts Schüssler Fiorenza's hermeneutical and methodological discussion. Her 
critiques of the prevailing interpretive models are often persuasive. And her attempt to seriously 
analyze the historical context with gender system as a fundamental category as well as highlight the 
ideological conflicts within the canonization process is welcome. Yet her model seems to lead her 
into feminist history about Christian women rather than Christian feminist historical reconstruction. 
Does she pull the Christian rug from under her project and relegate her work to historical inquiry on 
Christian feminist women by failing to generate Christian normative criteria to regulate her 
interpretation and appropriation of the past? I think not. She pushes us to the edge of the Christian 
tradition precisely to help us understand it as a deeply historical yet revelatory phenomenon. 
Schüssler Fiorenza's conception of truth and justification—her implicit ontology and 
epistemology— within her new hermeneutical model provides us with clues to her Christian 
identity. In contemporary hermeneutics there are three basic philosophical strategies regarding the 
separate yet related problems of truth and justification. The first strategy follows Hegel by discerning 
Truth within the depths of the historical process. This discernment consists of keeping track of the 
active, reflective, autonomizing Weltgeist who ultimately overcomes the historical process in order to 
achieve absolute self-consciousness and self-transparency. Refined versions of this perspective—put 
forward in religious form by Wolfgang Pannenberg and in Marxist form by Georg Lukács—holds 
that every hermeneutics requires some degree of transcendental, i.e., totalistic viewpoint. Therefore 
every hermeneutics, if honest about itself, presupposes a philosophy of history and hence is but a 
disguised form of Hegelianism. 
The second strategy incorporates Kierkegaardian insights regarding the radical transiency of 
historical claims and the ultimate mystery (or utter "absurdity") of God's self-disclosure in Jesus 
Christ. This strategy, developed by Barth and others, sits at the center of the neo-orthodox model. It 
employs sophisticated modes of historicist argumentation and, contrary to Schüssler Fiorenza's claim 
(culled from Peter Berger) that it invokes an "Archimedean point," refuses to look at the world sub 
specie aeternitatis. Yet this strategy claims that the existential power and world view generated by an 
encounter with Jesus Christ in the preached Word of the Christian community warrants the truth-
status of Christian revelation. 
The last strategy rests upon Gadamer's historicist perspective which understands Truth as 
revealment and concealment, as part and parcel of the perennial process of cultivating and refining 
inescapable traditions in relation to particular situations and circumstances. On this view, there can 
be no transcendental standpoint, but there indeed are transcending possibilities which build upon 
prevailing finite standpoints. The criterion for Truth here resides neither in Hegelian 
transcendentalism nor in Kierkegaardian fideism, but rather in the regulative ideal of the "Vorgriff 
der Vollkommenheit" (anticipation of perfection)—the openness to newness and novelty on the way 
to a perennially deferred unity. Like Dewey's pragmatism, this strategy shuns a Der-ridean 
unregulated free play of truth-effacing which lacks an applicatory, praxis-dimension and any form of 
closure. Instead this strategy promotes regulated historical praxis with only provisional closure 
without a constitutive telos. 
This third strategy runs deep throughout Schüssler Fiorenza's philosophical discussion. Her 
fundamental concern with human agency, the dialectical interplay of revealment and concealment, 
the situating of texts within Wirkungsgeschichte (continuously operative and influential history) shot 
through with social conflict and the conception of biblical texts and subsequent interpretations as 
human practices are all compatible with Gadamer's historicism. Yet, Schüssler Fiorenza refuses to go 
all the way down the historicist road. And, if she did so the Christian locus of truth and justification 
would be sacrificed. Contrary to the perceptions of many, the consequences of full-blown historicism 
are neither nihilistic relativism nor promiscuous pluralism; but for the Christian such historicism 
does result in a radical de-privileging of Jesus Christ as rendered in the biblical texts. One can surely 
follow the historicism of Gadamer and Dewey and sidestep vulgar relativistic traps. But for 
Christians to follow such paths means giving up the unique status of Jesus Christ. This is so because 
if one's historicism "goes all the way down" (like Hegel's) but resists neo-Platonic-like epistrophes 
(unlike Hegel's and like Gadamer's), then Jesus Christ becomes not only a historical person but also 
permeated by contradiction and imperfection. For the Christian, historical status of Jesus is crucial, 
but mere peer status of Jesus is unacceptable. To preserve the privileged status of Jesus Christ is 
ultimately to reject the Hegelian and Gadamerian strategies—and remain on Kierkegaardian terrain. 
This does not mean subscribing to a neo-orthodox model, simply that a neo-orthodox element 
sustains one's Christian identity. 
The privileged status of Jesus Christ looms large in Schüssler Fiorenza's text. Given her shift 
from androcentric texts to patriarchal contexts, one would expect a thorough interrogation of the 
patriarchal sensibilities and practices of Jesus, in and beyond the biblical texts. Instead, we are offered 
a view of Jesus as a "woman-identified man" with a basileia vision of a discipleship of equals, as if a 
reincarnate Jesus would join the contemporary feminist struggle against patriarchy. Such a presentist 
reading of the synoptic gospels reeks of Christian confessionalism and ahistorical moralism—the very 
charges Schüssler Fiorenza makes against feminist neo-orthodox Christian scholars. 
My point here is neither to promote a secular de-privileging of Jesus Christ nor to return to 
pre-feminist readings of biblical texts and the Christian tradition. Rather my point is to acknowledge 
the degree to which the Kierkegaardian-Barthian touchstone of modern Christian identity remains 
intact in Schüssler Fiorenza's work. I applaud this element in her text, but I remain unconvinced 
that it follows from her new hermeneutical model. The irreducible life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ— whose power and perspective is always found in human communities in dialogical 
form—is the mark of modern Christian identity. Schüssler Fiorenza's presentist portrait of Jesus 
Christ affirms this mark. Given her deep feminist commitments, this portrait becomes her way of 
preserving the privileged status of Jesus Christ. Without this status, the struggle for women's 
liberation has no Christian normative source. The struggle may warrant support, but there would be 
no Christian grounds to arrive at this conclusion. I believe that Christian texts and traditions—
without a presentist reading of Jesus Christ yet while preserving the irreducibility of Jesus Christ—
justify feminist liberation movements. But this justification is a historically-informed moral one. 
Is it contradictory and disempowering that Jesus Christ (male in human form) normatively 
grounds women's fight for freedom? I think not. Just as it is not contradictory that Jesus Christ 
(Jewish in ethnic origins) normatively grounds Arabs' struggle for human dignity in Israel—even as 
it grounds any struggle for human dignity. Only in an age obsessed with articulations of 
particularities (e.g., gender, race, nation) often relegated to the margins by false universalities (e.g., 
technocratic rationality, value-free and value-neutral inquiry) could such questions arise with 
potency. And only with a sophisticated emancipatory hermeneutics can a new conception of 
differential universality emerge which provides the framework for new perspectives and practices. 
Schüssler Fiorenza's powerful Christian interpretation and reconstruction of the biblical texts and 
early church move us closer to such a conception. 
